In numerous modern stream ciphers, the internal state consists of a large array of pseudo-random words, and the output key-stream is a relatively simple function of the state. In [16] , it was heuristically shown that in various cases this structure may lead to distinguishing attacks on the cipher. In this paper we further investigate this structural attack. We present a rigorous proof of the main probabilistic claim used in the attack in the basic cases, and demonstrate by examining a concrete example (the cipher sn3 [11] ) that the heuristic assumptions of the attack are remarkably precise in more complicated cases. Furthermore, we use the general technique to devise a distinguishing attack on the stream cipher mv3 [9] requiring 2 82 words of key-stream. Unlike the attacks in [16], our attack does not concentrate on the least significant bits of the words, thus allowing to handle the combination of more operations (xors, modular additions and multiplications, and rotations by a fixed number of bits) in the update and output rules of the cipher. * This is the full version of a paper submitted for publication in a journal, which contains only Sections 1, 2, and 3. The material in Section 4 concerns an attack on the mv3 stream cipher. After writing up a description of our results, we learned that essentially identical arguments -but with important miscalculations -had simultaneously been published in [15] . For the sake of completeness we include an appendix reconciling the two attacks. See footnote 2 for similar comments on the sn3 stream cipher.
Introduction
Stream ciphers are widely used in practical cryptography, especially in environments where the high speed of encryption is crucial. While in general there exist many different types of stream ciphers, there are several structures which are shared by numerous modern ciphers.
One of these structures is basing the internal state of the cipher on a very large array, where the output key-stream is a relatively simple function of the array elements. The first cipher having this structure was alleged rc4 (designed in 1987), and modern ciphers of this class include hc-256 [19] , the Py family [2] , sn3 [11] , ngg [13] , gghn [8] , mv3 [9] , and others (see [16] ). The main advantage of ciphers of this class is their high speed: due to the simple update and output rules, the encryption is very fast, while the security follows from pseudo-random accesses to a very large array, unknown to the attacker.
In alleged rc4, the array consists of a permutation of the values 0, 1, . . . , 255. In the modern ciphers, which are based on longer (usually, 32-bit) words, keeping a permutation of all the possible words in memory is infeasible, and hence the permutation is replaced by an array of pseudo-random words.
In [16] , Paul and Preneel showed heuristically that in various cases, the randomness of the array elements can be used to mount a distinguishing attack on the cipher. the xor of randomly chosen bits from a fixed, random array is not uniformly distributed, but has a slight bias towards zero.
This bias potentially applies to any cryptographic operation summing random entries from random arrays. Note that the attack does not work if the values of the array are not random (like in alleged rc4, where at any stage of the encryption, exactly half of the lsbs of the array elements are zeros). This is because in the case i = j, there is a small counter bias, which makes the overall probability unbiased. The main idea of the attack in [16] (originally presented in [7] ) is to find a condition E on the elements of the array, such that if E is satisfied, then the least significant bit (lsb) of a combination of the output words is biased; this bias is used to distinguish the output of the cipher from a random string.
In this paper we further investigate the structural attack presented in [16] . First, we present a rigorous generalization of Proposition 1 to compute the bias of the sum of k random elements, for all k ≥ 1. Then we demonstrate the precision of the heuristic assumption (i.e., the assumption that if the special event E does not occur, then there is no counter-bias) in more complicated cases by considering a concrete example. We devise a distinguishing attack on the stream cipher sn3 [11] . Hence, the heuristic assumption is remarkably precise in this case.
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Finally, we use the general technique to mount a distinguishing attack on mv3. The stream cipher mv3 [9] was designed by Keller et al. in 2006 , as an attempt to generalize the alleged rc4 structure to a 32-bit word based cipher. The internal state of the cipher consists of several large buffers of pseudo-random words, and the update and output rules are based on rapidly mixing random walks. The cipher uses a combination of different arithmetic operations on 32-bit words (xors, additions, and multiplications), as well as cyclical rotations by a fixed number of bits. While the encryption speed of mv3 is high (less than 5 cycles per byte), the initialization phase is very slow, and hence the cipher is appropriate for encrypting large amounts of data. The security claim made in [9] is that no attack on the cipher should be faster than exhaustive key search for 256-bit keys. As mentioned in the 2 We note that another distinguishing attack on sn3 was presented in [14] . The attack uses part of the observations used in our attack, along with different techniques. The authors of [14] claim that the attack requires 2 28.2 words of key-stream. However, a careful examination of the attack, presented in the appendix, shows that it requires about 2 38 words of key-stream, while our attack requires less than 2 30 words.
footnote on the first page, this attack was independently codiscovered in [15] , but with a mistaken complexity estimate. No other cryptographic attacks on the cipher have been presented thus far. Our distinguishing attack on mv3 requires 2
82
words of key-stream. The attack uses the higher-order differential technique [10] , examining the xor of quadruples of output words having a special structure. The main feature of the attack is that it does not concentrate on the least significant bits of the output words. Instead, the attack considers the xor of pairs of consecutive bits of the output words, following a technique presented by Cho and Pieprzyk [5] in a different context. As a result, the attack can handle fixed bit rotations and modular multiplications, unlike previous attacks of the same structure (e.g., [16, 19] ) that can handle only rotations by a pseudo-random number of bits, modular additions and xors.
3
While our distinguishing attack is clearly impractical, it is faster than the security claims asserted in [9] .
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the proof of the generalization of Proposition 1. The attack on sn3, along with the experimental verification of the results, is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the attack on mv3. In the appendix we discuss the flaws in the attacks presented in [14] and [15] .
Rigorous Proof of the Heuristic Assumption in Basic Cases
In this section we present a rigorous generalization of Proposition 1 to the sum of k random 0/1 elements, for all k ≥ 1. We give both an exact formula and a simpler asymptotic for large arrays. 
, and 
where Y = i≤N t i is the Binomial(N, 1/2) random variable whose probability distribution is given by the bracketed expression above. Expanding out this sum for k-th powers of X, we see
Combining these formulas shows that p k is determined by the expected value of moments of Y :
This establishes the formula asserted above, because this expected value is its second term. The special cases of p k mentioned can be seen by direct calculation.
As far as the limit of p 2k for N large, we recall the Central Limit Theorem: that the Binomial(N, 1/2) random variable is approximated by the Normal distribution with mean N/2 and variance N/4 (see [6, Chapter VII] ). This allows us to approximate the sum above with the integral
which -after changing variables to y = √ 2x − N -may be computed as
We use Proposition 2 as the basic tool in many of our probability calculations in what follows. In order to derive estimates using it, we need to make a working assumption that the array elements and pointers in the stream ciphers we study are themselves independently, identically uniformly distributed at random. Of course the point of this paper is to contradict that, by demonstrating an attackable bias. However, it seems numerically reasonable to make this assumption as an approximation, because a deviation that is strong enough to significantly affect our calculations would itself likely produce a stronger attack than the ones we present. In addition, in the complicated cases where the bias cannot be proved rigorously, we follow [16] in making the heuristic assumption that there is no counter-bias when the special event does not occur. The experiment presented in the next section demonstrates the precision of this assumption.
3 Distinguishing Attack on SN3
Description of SN3
The stream cipher sn3 [11] was designed by Simeon Maltchev in 2002. sn3 is a software-efficient stream cipher, optimized for execution on 32-bit micro processors. It is based on a large array of pseudo-random words, and uses only simple word operations, like xor and cyclical rotations.
The structure of sn3 is the following: The internal state of the cipher consists of three arrays V 1, V 2, and V 3, of sixty four 32-bit words each, and three 6-bit indices, i, j, and m. Index i addresses only the V 1 array, index j addresses only the V 2 array, and index m addresses only the V 3 array.
The key-stream generation is composed of 64-step cycles, where in each cycle, i takes the values from 0 to 63 sequentially, and j and m perform a (pseudo)-random walk, determined by the elements of the V 1 array. In each step, one word from each array is selected according to i, j, and m, the xor of these three words is outputted as the key-stream word, and the three words are used to update themselves by a relatively simple update rule.
The structure of a step is outlined in the pseudo-code below. In the code, ⊕ denotes bitwise xor, ≪ denotes cyclical left rotation, and denotes noncyclical right shift (which discards the rightmost bits). The key-stream word which is outputted at the end of the step is denoted K i . The indices i and j are set to zero at the beginning of the key-stream generation process.
1.
After each 64-step cycle, the arrays are rotated cyclically to the left: the contents of V 1 are placed in V 3; those of V 3, in V 2; and those of V 2, in V 1. We omit the key expansion algorithm, since it does not affect our attacks. Instead, we assume that the initial values in the arrays V 1, V 2, and V 3 are independently uniformly distributed.
Our Attack
The basic observation we use in the attack is a weakness in the update rule of V 1, V 2, and V 3. We observe that regardless of the values of the words T 1, T 2, and T 3 before the update operation, the values
after the update satisfy a simple linear relation involving the Hamming weight (the number of 1's in a word's binary representation). If these words are next updated simultaneously, this will result in a bias that is described below. 
that is, its binary representation has an even number of 1's.
Proof. Let g(x) denote the parity of the Hamming weight of a 32-bit word x, i.e., g(x) ≡ HW (x) (mod 2). It is easy to see that for any two words x and y, we have g(
for any 0 ≤ k ≤ 31. Using these rules and the formulas in steps 5-7 above, one sees
In order to exploit Proposition 3, we first give a criterion that describes such a simultaneous update of the three words above in terms of the indices (i, j, m) in the current step, and the indices (i , j , m ) in a certain step in the previous cycle of 64 steps. We denote the k-th step in the r-th cycle by S r k , and examine the triples of indices (i, j, m) corresponding to each step. 
be the words producing the output of this step (i.e., for this step,
The event occurs when these three conditions are satisfied:
In the steps S r−1 i
for all i > a 3 , the indices satisfy j = a 1 and m = a 2 . , and Conditions 2 and 3 assure that none of them was updated since the simultaneous update. In the next proposition we calculate the probability of occurrence of events E r k , based on our randomness assumption mentioned at the end of Section 2. 
In the steps S
Proof. First, we calculate the probability of the event E , and 4 Throughout this paper, numbers are rounded to the last decimal place.
(1 − 1/64) 2a 1 , respectively. Since the three conditions are independent, the probability of the event E r k in this case is
The unconditional probability of the event E r k is the average of the conditional probabilities over all the possible values of a 2 and a 3 . Hence,
The assertion follows since a 1 = k.
Using Proposition 4 we can show that the parity of the Hamming weight of the key-stream words in sn3 is biased. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Since for a random stream, the parity of the Hamming weights of the words is unbiased, we get the following: ).) We modified Maltchev's C code [11] to check this, and ran it on a Dell PowerEdge 2650 with an Intel Zeon 2.6ghz processor and 2gb ram. The stream cipher mv3 [9] was designed by Keller et al. in 2006 . The main goal of its design is to adapt the alleged RC4 structure to word-based stream ciphers, in which storing in memory a permutation of all the possible words is infeasible. The internal state of the cipher is an array of pseudo-random words, and the output rule is based on random accesses to the array determined by rapidly mixing random walks on directed graphs. In addition, the cipher uses a combination of different arithmetic word operations (xors, additions, and multiplications), as well as cyclical rotations.
The structure of mv3 is the following: The heart of the internal state is an array T of 256 32-bit words, which is slowly updated during the key-stream of the Hamming weight parity of sn3 output words. Were they indeed unbiased, the graph would be centered near zero, rather than having the negative slope it displays due to the bias calculated above. generation phase. In addition, the internal state contains three buffers A, B, and C of 32 words each, that are cyclically shifted every 32 steps (namely, buffer A is discarded, buffer B becomes A, buffer C becomes B, and fresh values compose the new buffer C). The internal state is completed by several indices: secret word indices x and c and byte index j, that are updated using random walks on different directed graphs, and publicly known indices i (running from 0 to 31) and u (running from 0 to 255). The key-stream words are combinations of words taken from the A, B, and C buffers, where the array T is used for updating the indices and refilling the buffer C. The key-stream generation procedure is presented in the following pseudo-code:
Input: length len Output: stream of length len repeat len/32 times for i = 0 to 31
In the code, + and · denote addition and multiplication modulo 2
32
, respectively, and (≫ k) denotes cyclical rotation by k bits to the right. The symbol ∨ denotes a logical or operation, and ⊕ denotes bitwise xor.
We omit the key initialization phase of the cipher, since it does not affect our attacks. Instead, we assume that the internal state is initialized with perfectly random words. In particular, since the initial values of the indices x, c, and j are determined in the initialization phase, we assume that these values are random, in accordance with the working assumption at the end of Section 2.
Distinguishing Attack on a Simplified Variant of MV3
In order to explain the main idea of our attack clearly, we start with considering a simplified variant of the cipher in which some cyclical rotations are removed. Namely, the update rule of buffer C is replaced by the simpler rule
and the output rule is replaced by
The rest of the structure remains unchanged. In this simplified variant, the attacker can concentrate on the least significant bits (lsbs) of the output words, for which modular additions are equivalent to bitwise xors. Moreover, since the lsb of c is always equal to 1, the lsb of x · c is always equal to the lsb of x. Hence, if the attacker examines only the lsbs of the output words, the simplified variant of the cipher is equivalent to an even simpler variant in which the update rule of x is replaced by
and the output rule is simply
In the attack, we consider the xor of two output words Out(i 1 ) and Out(i 2 ), given at steps i 1 and i 2 of the same 32-step loop in the key generation process, where i 2 − i 1 is even. We have 2 + 18] are also xors of an even number of randomly chosen elements of the array T , and thus, their lsbs are also biased toward zero. Because of our working assumption that the elements of A, B, and C are independent, these biases can be combined using Matsui's Piling-up Lemma [12] to compute the bias of the lsb of the expression (3) . To be precise, denote by q k the bias toward zero of the xor of k random 0/1 elements (in the notation of Proposition 2, q k = p k − 1/2). Furthermore, let
Then by Matsui's Piling-up Lemma, 
Since for a random string, the expression in the left hand side is unbiased, Formula (4) can be used to distinguish the output of this simplified variant of mv3 from a random string using less than 2 88 words of output.
Distinguishing Attack on MV3
When attacking the original version of mv3, the attacker cannot restrict himself to the lsbs of the words in buffer C. Due to the cyclical rotations, even if the attacker considers only the lsbs of the output words, he has to deal also with bits 8 and 24 of buffer C that influence the output through buffers A and B. As a result, the update rule
, and thus the attacker has to overcome the composition of xors and modular additions. In particular, the observation used in Section 4.2 is not valid anymore: while the xor of an even number of random elements of the T array is biased in each of its bits, the same is not true for their modular sum.
In order to overcome these difficulties, we consider the xor of four output words in the same 32-step loop, having the following special structure:
for an appropriate choice of i 1 , i 2 , and l. We note that while the simplified attack presented in Section 4.2 resembles the differential cryptanalysis technique [3] , the attack presented here is an instance of higher-order differential cryptanalysis [10] . We have:
Like in the simplified attack, we consider each of the terms (6), (7), and (8) separately, and show that a certain linear combination of its bits is biased toward zero. Then, we use Matsui's Piling-up Lemma [12] to combine these biases into a bias of the entire expression.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider first a simplified version of the term (6) in which the cyclical rotations and the multiplication with c are removed. We shall show later that both the rotations and the multiplication by c do not change the conclusions of our argument. Hence, we consider the simplified term:
The basic observation we use in our attack is the following: 
where j(i) denotes the value of the index j at step i of the loop. That is,
by adding a sum of l random elements of the T array.
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If the indices of the two sequences of random elements are equal (possibly in a different order), then we have
where "-" denotes subtraction (mod 2
32
). We show that the relation (10) can be used to detect a set of biases satisfied by Expression (9) , which is invariant under cyclical rotations.
In order to exploit expression (10) to detect a bias in the expression (9), we have to find a relation between the subtraction operation used in (10) and the xor operation used in (9) . Note that we seek for a relation that is invariant under cyclical rotations, and hence the obvious relations using the msb or the lsb are not sufficient for our purpose. We use the following result, due to Cho and Pieprzyk [5] : 
Using Proposition 6, we can give a precise form to Observation 1. 
Proof. We consider first a simplified version of the statement, without the cyclical rotation and multiplication by c. As noted in Observation 1, we have
and similarly with i 1 replaced by i 2 . Denote by E 1 the following event: the two multisets {j (i 1 +1), j(i 1 +2) , . . . , j(i 1 +l)} and {j(i 2 +1), j(i 2 +2), . . . , j(i 2 +l)} are equal. It is clear that if the event E 1 occurs, then
Thus, we can apply Proposition 6 with
.
If the event E 1 does not occur, then by the randomness of the elements of the T array, the expression in the left hand side is unbiased. Hence, in total,
The probability of the event E 1 depends on the overlapping between the 
. (13) Furthermore, since in Equation (13) the indices of i are distinct, we can use the randomness assumption on the index j, to assume that the indices j(·) in both sides of the equation are independently uniformly distributed in {0, 1, . . . , 255}. The probability of E 1 is bounded from below by the probability of the following event E 2 : all the elements of each of the multisets
, and the two multisets are equal. It is easy to see that
Substituting this into (12) proves the proposition when the cyclical rotations and multiplications by c are omitted. However, it is clear from the proof that if one rotates all words in the buffer C by a constant number of bits, and multiplies them all by the same word c, a similar argument applies. Now consider Equation (5) at the beginning of this subsection. Proposition 7 asserts that the term (6) is biased toward zero. Since the elements of buffers A and B are obtained from elements of buffer C in previous loops, the argument of Proposition 7 is valid also for the terms (7) and (8), and hence both of them are also biased toward zero. The exact lower bounds on the biases are obtained by substituting the triples (9i 1 + 5, 9i 2 + 5, 9l) mod (32) and (7i 1 + 18, 7i 2 + 18, 7l) mod (32) in Proposition 7 in the place of (i 1 , i 2 , l) . In total, Proposition 7 can be applied to all the three terms (6), (7), and (8) if the following three pairs of conditions are satisfied:
For terms (7) and (8), we replace the value l 1 computed in Proposition 7 for the term (6) by respectively. Combining the biases using Matsui's Piling-up Lemma [12] , we thus get:
, and the six conditions described in (14) are satisfied. Then for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 30 one has 
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For each of these quadruples, we have l 1 = 1 and l 2 = l 3 = 2, and thus, 
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we examined a structural distinguishing attack introduced in [16] , applicable to stream ciphers whose internal state consists of arrays of pseudo-random words, and whose output is a relatively simple function of the internal state. We presented a rigorous proof of the heuristic assumptions used in the attack in basic cases, along with experimental evidence for the precision of the assumptions in more complicated cases. In addition, we extended the technique, allowing it to handle more complicated update and output rules, and used it to mount a distinguishing attack on the cipher mv3 [9] , requiring less than 2 82 words of output. 10 The values of the 22 optimal quadruples (i 1 , i 1 + l, i 2 , i 2 + l) are: (0, 1, 14, 15), (0, 1, 18, 19), (1, 2, 15, 16) , (3, 4, 21, 22) , (4, 5, 18, 19) , (4, 5, 22, 23) , (5, 6, 19, 20) , (5, 6, 23, 24) , (6, 7, 20, 21) , (6, 7, 24, 25) , (7, 8, 21, 22 ), (7, 8, 25, 26) , (8, 9, 22, 23) , (8, 9, 26, 27 ), (9, 10, 23, 24) , (11, 12, 29, 30) , (12, 13, 26, 27) , (12, 13, 30 , 31), (13, 14, 27, 28) , (14, 15, 28, 29) , (15, 16, 29, 30) , (16, 17, 30, 31) .
Our attacks, along with previously published distinguishing attacks on stream ciphers based on arrays (e.g., [16, 19] ), show that unless the output rule is very complex, it is difficult to avoid "academic" distinguishing attacks. However, perhaps this should not necessarily be considered a weakness of such ciphers. Instead, since extremely long key-streams are not used in real-life applications, it seems reasonable to ask what complexity of a distinguishing attack is reasonable to tolerate before deeming a stream cipher insecure with respect to it.
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Replacing the right hand side by the correct value of 2 −18 results in reducing the probability of occurrence of Event I (computed at the bottom of Page 3) from 2 ), and hence the number of samples required for the distinguishing is approximately 2
32
. Since each sample is obtained from a cycle of 64 words, the overall data complexity of the attack is close to 2 38 key-stream words.
A.2 The Attack on MV3 Presented in [15]
The attack is essentially the same as the attack presented in our paper, but claims a different overall complexity due to the following errors: . Since the order does not matter, the probability is approximately doubled. Hence, the correct probability is approximately 2 .
The right hand side is incorrect. The formula follows from combining the relation Const1 = Const2 which holds (by the author's claims) with probability 2 −13.99 , and the approximation of the relation between XOR and addition (taken from the paper of Cho and Pieprzyk) which holds with probability 2/3. Hence, the correct probability is · (1/6).
3. The bias of expression (6) (instead of (2/3) · 2
−8
). Hence, the total probability should be updated to Note that this probability agrees with the probability computed in our attack in (15).
4. The number of samples required for the distinguishing attack is computed as n = 2 approximations that can be used in parallel). Hence, the overall data complexity in key-stream words should be multiplied by 2
5
Combining all the corrections, the bias of the approximation should be multiplied by 2
7
, and the final data complexity should be multiplied by 2
5
. Hence, the correct data complexity of the attack is 
